Project Description

CHAPTER ONE

1.1       INTRODUCTION

The geographic entity called Nigeria was formally created in 1914 following the amalgamation of the then Northern and Southern Protectorates by Sir Fredrick Lord Lugard, who became the first Governor General, thus heralding the formal occupation of the territory by Britain as one of its colonies (Openmind Foundation). Agriculture was the country’s major foreign exchange earner. The various regions that make up the country, northern, western and eastern regions were, endowed with different agricultural produce (ground nut, cocoa and palm oil respectively) (Adekoya, 2010). The discovery of oil in 1956 and the subsequent oil boom of the 1970s led to a sharp decline in the volume of agricultural produce from these various geopolities. Agriculture which accounted for over 65% of the country’s GDP in 1959 fell to a minimal 9% in the 1980s (www.mongaby.com) while oil rose from a meagre 0.3% in the 1960s to over 75% at the turn of the century (Lawal, 2004 cited in Ikelegbe, 2005:208;  Braji, 2006.par. 11; Alawode & Omisakin, 2011:1; Amnesty, 2009:11).

The economic importance of natural resource exploitation in Nigeria cannot be over-emphasized. Of overriding significance is oil and gas exploitation in the Niger Delta region, which is the economic lifeblood of the nation and has influenced the nature and character of politics in the country (Ibeanu, 2008). The region equally produces tin, timber, steel, tin, rubber, palm oil and many more, aside oil and gas. However, the discovery of oil in commercial quantity led to a sharp decline in the production of these other foreign exchange earning products (mongaby.com). Consequently, the concentration of productive forces on oil and the emergence of a monocultural economy anchored on the aggressive exploitation of oil forced people engaged in these other products to embrace the new national resource (Edo, 2011). Since 1956, when oil was discovered in commercial quantity in Oloibiri, present day Bayelsa State of Nigeria’s Niger Delta region, the place (Niger Delta) has witnessed a continual flurry of exploration and processing activities by multinational oil companies, which doubles as gas producers. Nigeria relies heavily on oil revenue and recently, revenue from natural gas has added to the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Hydrocarbon is the country’s single most important export commodity. If recent discovery is anything to go by, natural gas production will triple the quantum of oil production as the country has natural gas reserve that is three times more than oil (Igwe, 2011).

Prospecting for crude oil and invariably, gas dates back to 1908 when a German Firm, the Nigerian Bitumen Company (NBC) commenced operation around Okitipupa in present day Ondo State. The NBC after initial search for bitumen switched to oil. This was followed by Shell D’Arcy in 1937 when the former abandoned the project due to inexplicable “politics and the aftermath of the World War I” (Ebohon, 2013:209).

Natural gas is either Associated or non-associated with oil in oilwells. In the Niger Delta the bulk of natural gas endowment is associated. As such it is accidental to the exploration and production of crude oil (Aghalino, 2009), which was in high demand globally in the late 1950s through the 1970s. With the success recorded by Shell British Petroleum in the discovery of oil in commercial quantity, many other foreign oil companies angling for operating license made their way into the burgeoning hydrocarbon industry in the country. These later entrants include Eni, Chevron, Total and ExxonMobil operating Joint Venture (JV) with the national oil behemoth, the Nigerian  National Petroleum Corporation, NNPC (Amnesty, 2009; Gilbert, 2010). There was no particular gas production development template in the early days of oil production. Hence there was no specific gas policy regime guiding, as it were, gas production and utilisation in the country. As a result, oil production companies prefer to waste the gas incidental and associated to crude oil production in what is referred to as gas flaring (Niger Delta Environmental Survey, 1996). Flaring of associated gas in the Niger Delta since 1957 with an estimated initial production output of 2,014 million cubic feet (Aghalino, 2009) has continued in over 1,000 different locations in the region (Alakpodia, 2000) whereas the same is converted to industrial and domestic use in other countries namely, Canada, The Netherlands, Norway, etc (Diugwu., Ijaiya., Mohammed & Egila, 2013) which contravenes extant anti-flare out legislations with the first legislation in 1969 (Ogbara, 2009). Huge balls of smoke still cover the skyline of the region causing excessive heat, deafening noise from the production facility, lighted night, rusted roofing sheet, contaminated water, health-related problems as well as degradation of the environment (UNDP, 2006; Bassey, 2008; Ibeanu, 2008:11).

The Niger Delta region holds 100% of the oil and gas deposits in the country (Quist-Arcton, 2007). Crude oil export from this region accounts for over 90% of the country’s foreign exchange earnings and 75% of her Gross Domestic Project (GDP) (James, 2010). Earnings from the oil and gas sector contribute the highest amount of revenue to government coffers since the early 1970s following the global oil boom.

Apart from oil production, the region is equally reputed for the production of natural gas. Natural gas in the region is the highest in Africa and among the highest in the world. With a proven natural gas reserve of 5,154  million standard cubic metres and “300 trillion standard cubic feet undiscovered but recoverable gas” (OPEC, 2011; Malumfashi, 2007:23), Nigeria is the 7^th largest natural gas producing country in the world and the 1^st in Africa (Ernst & Young , 2012:6; Mokuye, Ezebuiro &  Ekomaru, 2013:180).

According to Babatunde (2010:1) the Niger Delta region has “the largest mangrove forests in Africa and the third largest in the world”. It is Nigeria’s largest wetland region and covers over 70,000 square kilometres between latitude 4⁰50’ and longitude 5⁰25’E and 7⁰37’E (Oluwagbami, 2001; Idris, 2008; Anwana, 2011). The region has an estimated population of 30 million people accounting for over 23% of the country’s total population as of 2005 and it is believed to be the most heterogeneous having over 20 different languages (Saro-Wiwa, 1995; Kemedi, 2003; UNDP Report, 2006; Malumfashi, 2007) which include Ijaw, Itshekiri, Urhobo, Isoko, Ogoni, Efik, Ibibio, Bini, Ika, Ukwani, Igbo, Yoruba, etc. Prior to 2000, the Niger Delta comprised of six states of the south-south namely Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. But the NDDC Act 2000 extended the states and region to include Abia, Imo and Ondo (Malumfashi, 2007). The nine states have a total of 185 Local Government Areas with over 20 different ethnic nationalities (Dike, 1965; Ikime, 1972; Onosode, 2003). The Niger Delta suffers from high illiteracy rate; high mortality rate and low life expectancy due to their continued exposure to health-reducing oil-related activities of the MNOCs (UNDP, 2006). The Region had a death rate of 14.7 per 1000 in 2003 (Omuta, 2011) and life expectancy estimate of 43 years (UNDP Report, 2006).

The huge oil revenue accruing to the government has not been translated into tangible benefits to the people of the Niger Delta, where the oil wealth that sustained the country in the past fifty years has been produced. The environmental degradation of the terrain makes the region an ecological disaster (Babatunde 2010). The economic benefits from natural gas have not been properly harnessed in Nigeria compared to other gas destinations in Africa like Algeria, Egypt and Libya whose natural gas reserves are lesser than what Nigeria has. Algeria tops the natural gas production list in Africa with 83.7BCM followed by Egypt (60.6BCM) (Ernst &Young, 2012:7).

In view of these enormous capacity of the gas market, the inability of Nigeria to key into the current global gas production drive by mandating the oil producing companies to end wasting of over $2billion daily to gas flaring is lamentable and a reflection of institutional weakness (Auge, 2010). It has been much talk with little or at best feeble action in harnessing this natural endowment for the purpose of driving industrialization, job creation and invariably, national economic growth and political power in the world energy-dominant politics. Although natural gas production in Nigeria is not entirely a new development, it was not until 1999 that the first train of liquefied gas was exported from the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Terminal. This first shipment marked the country’s entrance into the league of gas producing economies. The country as at 2011 has 160 trillion cu ft of gas reserve and 37.2 billion barrels of oil reserve which places Nigeria second only to Libya’s 39 billion barrels in terms of oil reserves (EIA, 2006).

This study, therefore, focuses on the Nigerian state, politics of natural gas production and its implications for environmental sustainability in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

1.2       STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Right from the time Nigeria joined the league of oil producing countries; gas production for domestic and foreign utilisation has never been taken seriously. The multinational oil companies were concerned with oil production, thus no serious attention was given to the production and utilisation of natural gas. The country ranked 27^th in the world with 29BCM of gas produced as at 2010 below Algeria, 9^th and Egypt, 13th (Wikipedia.com) with about 187tcf. This figure shows an increase of 23 tcf over the figure in 2006. Further research findings however, reveal that Nigeria has a proven gas reserve of 600tcf estimate, the highest in Africa (Corporate Nigeria, 2010). This is an indication that the players and stakeholders in the oil and gas sector lack accurate figure of the amount of natural gas the country has. The MNOCs, the State oil monopoly, NNPC, and private bodies seem to have different figures. This clearly shows the lack lustre attitude of the Nigerian state. Proved Reserves refer to the quantity of oil and natural gas estimated to be recoverable from known fields under existing economic and operating conditions. This is determined on the basis of drilling results, production and historical trends. In spite of her enormous gas endowment, Nigeria still lags behind Algeria and Egypt in terms of daily production. This could be traced to low production and distribution caused by lack of gas infrastructure to channel produced gas to the various power stations, and industries that need the product, and a concrete pricing regime. Gas is still being flared in the country. In fact, Nigeria still flares more than 2.5 billion cubic feet (bcf) of natural gas daily (Uche, 2012 www.oilandgas.com). James (2010) laments that this waste in Dollar term is $2.5b daily and this amount is higher than the annual budget of the country when a yearly estimate is made. The Nigerian government is willing to lose over N4tr. because of the revenue it receives as fine for flaring the associated gas which would cease should there be an end to gas flaring.

Flaring of Associated Gas (AG) encountered during the search or production of oil is a deliberate cost-saving policy adopted by MNOCs. While the oil is processed, the associated gas can be flared, vented or re-injected into the wellhead. In 2012, government reported that 20% of gas produced was flared (Jonathan, 2013). But verifiable data from credible environmental agencies put the amount of flared gas at 50% (Uche, 2012 www.oilandgas.com). This is still a far cry from the zero flare rating Royal Dutch Shell in the Netherlands- the parent company of Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) operating in Nigeria- has attained. Norway recorded less than 0.05% flare out compliance as at 2003 (Onyekonwu, 2007:7). The amount of unutilised gas (wasted energy resource) via flaring in Nigeria is about 45% of the energy requirements of France, the world’s 4th largest economy (Ashton et al 1999 cited in Onyekonwu, 2007:8).

The country’s multibillion dollar foreign exchange potential accruable from the sale of gas goes up in flames daily in the Niger Delta till date. The incentives provided by government to harness the gas resource, create employment and stimulate economic growth notwithstanding. Laudable projects like the Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline Project (TSGP) conceived in 2001 is yet to kick off due to government epileptic attempt and foot-dragging (Auge, 2010). Even the West African Gas Pipeline Project (WAGP) which commenced operation in 2010 was shut down in 2012. Flare out deadlines come and go and oil producing companies flout these legislations with impunity. Penalty for such mindless acts has been nothing but a slap on the wrist. This is the direct opposite from what obtains in the developed economies where these same oil corporations operate.

In its Country Analysis Briefs, Energy Information Administration (EIA, 2011:1) notes that:

Nigeria holds the largest natural gas reserves in Africa but has limited infrastructure in place to develop the sector. Natural gas that is associated with oil production is mostly flared but the development of regional pipelines, the expansion of liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure and policies to ban gas flaring are expected to accelerate growth in the sector, both for export and domestic use in electricity generation.

These moves are yet to accelerate growth in the gas subsector. Nigeria is endowed with vast natural gas, coal, and renewable energy resources that could be used for domestic electricity generation and foreign exchange earnings. Regrettably, the country lacks policies that could be effectively deployed to harness the huge resources and develop and/or improve the electricity infrastructure, attract foreign exchange and create job opportunities. The country is still grappling with the problem of epileptic electricity supply; inexplicable youth unemployment for a well endowed country like Nigeria; dilapidated infrastructure and mounting local and foreign debt. Several plans had been initiated by successive Nigerian governments to address the looming unemployment, insecurity and the need for power, including a recent announcement to create 40 Gigawatts (GW) of capacity by 2020 (compared to 2008 installed capacity of 6 GW).

Meanwhile, Igwe (2011:1) states that:

Natural gas as a raw material is produced in abundance in oil and gas wells throughout Nigeria. Nigerian gas is concentrated in the Niger Delta which covers an area of about 41,000 sq. miles (106,189.50 km2). Of the total Nigeria’s proven reserves, 70% is located on land while 30% can be found off-shore. About 60% are located east of the River Niger while the rest are to the West of the River Niger. Experts estimate that the reserves locked in the Nigerian soil is enough to last as long as 500 years, fuelling our industries, homes, and international export.

This abundant resource has remained underdeveloped due to so many limitations. Prior to 1999, over 75% of associated gas incidental to the production of oil was flared. Nigeria’s notoriety in this unhealthy practice made her at one time the highest gas flaring nation in the world, (Malumfashi, 2007). Akinjide, Kola-Balogun & Akinjide (1998:1) corroborated the foregoing thus:

Gas production in Nigeria is mostly linked to the production of oil. This “associated gas” is separated from oil at flow stations and more than 70 percent of it is simply flared. Current estimates show that Nigeria produces an average of 34 billion cubic metres (bcm) of gas yearly out of which 75 per cent is flared.

The foregoing is a far cry from economic development and wielding of political power centred around gas ownership, production and control. Russia has properly harnessed and utilized its gas product through its monopoly company, Gazprom. Russia controls 25% of gas supply to the whole of Western Europe (Auge, 2010) which makes her a dominant power bloc in her economic sphere of influence; and the little island state of Trinidad and Tobago whose gas market has spread from the Carribean to America, Europe, Japan and South Korea (Campbell, 2007). Trinidad and Tobago has sustained her supply chain since she hit the gas market with her first train of LNG in April, 1999 (the same year that Nigeria also shipped her first train of LNG to the global gas market). While investment in gas production is bringing more economic returns as well as conferring political clout on countries like Russia, Trinidad and Tobago, Iran, etc, Nigeria is still grappling with reaping the massive gains in gas production and supply due to government foot-dragging on the phase-out of gas flaring and the conversion of the flared gas to usable forms (Aghalino, 2009; Campbell, 2007). Even though Nigeria’s natural gas exports increased from 25,941 million standard cubic feet in 2011 to 28,266 million standard cubic in 2012, representing nine per cent increase from the previous year (Okere, 2013), the problem of gas flaring (13.182mscf)- a major environmental issue- still subsists. Igwe (2011:5) identified five key barriers that have hindered the country from experiencing rapid economic growth from the multibillion gas subsector as “pricing, fiscal terms, institutional and infrastructural arrangements, legal and regulatory framework, and financing”.

The rise in the global demand for gas has brought attendant negative impact on the environment. It is hard to believe that Nigeria still allows gas flaring in spite of its unequivocal pursuit, at least on paper, to major international environmental agreements such as convention on Bio-diversity, Climate change, and Ozone layer protection among others. In what would be considered a volte force the proviso in the original Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) to wit, that gas flaring would end at all oil production installations in Nigeria by December 31, 2012, has been left hanging in the new version of the PIB with no definite end to flaring of gas, a practice that has been declared illegal by a Benin High Court since 2005. The New PIB reads that gas flare phase-out will be as soon as practicable (Bassey, 2008; PIB, 2012a; PIB, 2012b). Section 275 of the Draft PIB (2012b:144) reads thus:

Natural gas shall not be flared or vented after a date (‘the flare out date) to be prescribed by the Minister in regulations made pursuant to this Part, in any oil and gas producing operation, block or field, onshore or offshore, gas facility such as, processing or treatment plant, with the exception of permits granted under subsection (1) of Section 277 of this Act.

This is contrary to the first version of this Bill with a definite time frame for an end to flaring of gas. In the first version of the PIB (2012a, 132-133) it was provided that “Natural gas shall not be flared or vented after 31^st December, 2012, in any oil and gas production operation, block or field, onshore or offshore, or gas facility (e.g. processing treatment plant), with the exception of such permits granted under section (1)(b).”

Emerging global energy consumption pattern has shown a rising increase in the demand for natural gas. It has been projected that global consumption of natural gas will double by 2030, edging it past coal to become the second most exploited source of energy in the world (EIA, 2004). Gas has gained popularity due to its relatively clean and efficient combustion when compared to both coal and oil. Growth in demand is expected to be greatest in the United States, Western Europe, China, Brazil and India, primarily for generation of electrical power to be used by heavy industry and residences (Barnes, et al 2006). Nigerian gas is highly sought after due to its 0% sulphur content (Ige, 2008). Though gas production in Nigeria increased to 84.845 million standard cubic feet (mscf) in 2012 as against 84.004 mscf in 2011 (Okere, 2013); a lot more need to be done to gather all the stranded and/or wasted gas in wellheads in all the oil production sites in the Niger Delta put at 350Mmcf/d due to lack of infrastructure and delay in some National Integrated Power Projects (NIPP), especially in eastern Niger Delta (Ige, 2012:7).

The obvious deduction from the above is that hydrocarbon (oil and gas) exploration and production in Nigeria is initiated, midwifed and sustained by MNOCs that are transnational in nature. The Nigerian State has been the rent collector and has presence in the managerial position in its Joint Venture agreement with these foreign oil and gas companies. Its lack of technical expertise has continued to limit its regulatory functions through the NNPC leaving this critical aspect to foreign expatriates which is an equally dangerous part to tow as it undermines the sovereignty of the Nigerian nation. The Petroleum Act, 1969 Section 1 Cap 350 LFN and the 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Section 40 (1) and (3) as well as the 1999 Constitution Section 44 (3) provide that the “entire ownership and control of all petroleum (gas, oil and condensate) resources and reserves in the Federal Republic of Nigeria is vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria” Onyekonwu (2007: 4). These legislations transferred ownership of every resource found in, under, airspace and territorial waters of Nigeria to the Federal Government. This was a wholesale adaptation of the 1914 Mineral Act amended in 1946 in which Section 3 (1) “vested all mineral oils found under or upon any land, under rivers, streams and water courses on the Crown (The British Government)”, Onyekonwu (2007: 2).

By granting operational license to foreign oil companies to prospect and produce oil and gas products, the country, technically speaking, handed over part of its sovereignty to external institutions, the MNOCs, to have a say in its internal politics. The massive environmental problems arising from oil production, namely gas flaring, pollution, etc are the consequences of continuous abuse of Niger Delta indigenes and government’s absence in the region having given the MNOCs the right to full exploitation of the oil related resources. Copious and various environmental policies and laws intended to ensure healthy environment as well as regulate the activities of MNOCs have remained unenforceable largely owing to the centrality of oil wealth to the continued survival of the Nigerian state which is benefitting from the existing arrangement whereby oil companies pay paltry sum as fines especially for flaring money-bearing gas in their operation fields across the Niger Delta, turning deaf ear to the pernicious living condition of people in this region (Saro-Wiwa, 1995). The oil companies equally prefer to pay these fines instead of installing gas gathering facilities that require heavy financial investment (Environmental Right Action (ERA), 2011) which obviously they are not ready to embark on.

Mean while, existing scholarship have implicated corruption; weak government structure, sabotage and lack of political will by the Nigerian state in partnership with its various environmental regulatory agencies, as reasons for the continued gross underutilization of natural gas and its subsequent wastage through gas flaring in the Niger Delta. Although these are true, scholarship appears to ignore a deeper cause of this odious scenario in the Country’s hydrocarbon industry. In deed the country’s colonial heritage (structure, governance, etc) and its peripheral attachment to the western capitalist economic system which encourages transnational organizations to control economic activities in foreign lands, especially in developing economies have not been given adequate systematic analysis. The study shall attempt to fill the lacuna noted in the literature within the context of the following research questions:

• Has the poor implementation of environmental policies by the Nigerian State compromised sustainable environment in the Niger Delta?
• Does the dominance of oil and gas production by multinational oil companies undermine the State’s ability to ensure sustainable environment in the Niger Delta?

1.3       OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The broad objective of this study is to examine the Nigerian state, politics of natural gas production and environmental sustainability in the Niger Delta region, 1999- 2012. However, the specific objectives are:

1. To determine if poor implementation of environment policies by the Nigerian state has compromised sustainable environment in the Niger Delta;
2. To establish if the dominance of oil and gas production by multinational companies undermines the state’s ability to ensure sustainable environment in the Niger Delta.

1.4       SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Study on gas production has attracted serious local and global attention in the wake of increased global demand for the product as a good alternative to other forms of fossil fuels.

Expectedly, the study has theoretical as well as practical significance. It will in no small measure fertilize desire for more research into this aspect of our national economic life. Furthermore, it will be a template for mobilizing effective State-led gas production regime in order to drive the economy. It will add to the existing body of knowledge and act as a reference point for further study.

Practically, the study will engender the emergence of vibrant non-governmental environmental awareness and advocacy groups that will embark on massive environmental awareness campaign beyond the currently existing agitative groups. Policy makers, community and faith-based leaders will find this work invaluable in formulating environmentally friendly policies, enlightening their followers and members in adopting environmentally healthy practices. It will equally serve as a veritable piece in the struggle for environmentally just and equitable living in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

1.5       LITERATURE REVIEW

Review of existing literature came under two subheadings. The first considered policies of Nigerian government on the environment and the extent of implementation. And the second covered the Nigerian State and its implementation of environmental policies, especially in gas production in the Niger Delta and its implication for sustainable environment.

Government Policies and Environmental Sustainability

Adibe & Essaghah (1999); Obabori, Ekpu & Ojealaro (2009); Ibaba (2010); Eneh & Agbazue (2011); Omuta (2011); Anyanwu (2012); Fagbohun (2012) and Adelegan (2004) agreed that the year 1988 marked a watershed in environmental policy regime in Nigeria. This not by a deliberate attempt and informed willingness for its imperative in safeguarding the health and wellbeing of Nigerians but a response to a trespass by two Italian firms which dumped a 3,880 metric tons of assorted harmful wastes of five shiploads at Koko, present day Delta State as a face-saving measure. This ugly incident revealed the paucity of environmental policy in the country safe for inchoate patchwork legislations inserted and interspersed in other Laws, Decrees and Acts that are incidental to the environment. The military top brass of the day waking up from the shock promulgated the first comprehensive environmental policy, the Harmful Waste (Special Criminal Provisions, etc) Decree No.42 of 1988.  The law makes it an offence for any person to “carry, deposit, dump, or be in possession, for the purpose of carrying, depositing or dumping, any harmful waste anywhere on Nigerian soil, inland waters or seas”. This was immediately followed by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Decree No.58, 1989 on December, 30^th and it was later known as FEPA Act, 1999.

FEPA was an agency of the Federal Government. It was the first environmental body to be created by the Nigerian State. It provides in Section 41 that the environment “includes water, air, land and all plants and human beings or animals living therein and the interrelationships which exist among these or any of them.” (FEPA Act, 1989:18) The FEPA Act was a well celebrated piece of fine legislation that put the problem of the environment on the front burner. In the years following, more and more environmental decrees, policies, legislations and standards were reeled out by the government. Ebohme (2006:3) delineated Nigeria’s environmental legislation into two eras namely, Pre-1988 and Post-1988. The former include: The Mineral Ordinance 1914; Forestry Ordinance 1937; The Oil Pipeline Act 1958; The Petroleum Drilling and Project ion Act 1969; The Sea Fisheries Decree 1971; The Sea Fisheries Regulation 1972; Exclusive Economic Zone Decree 1978; The Kanji Lake National Park Decree 1979; The Endangered Species Decree 1985; National Conservation Strategy for Nigeria 1986 (Dibie, 2000:133). These are by no means an exhaustive list of pre-1988 environmental legislations. Regions and States equally promulgated and/or enacted Decrees and laws within the timeframe.

Citing Ogbalu (n.d), Ebohme (2006) asserts that Post-1988 environmental regime was a response to a National Emergency- alluding to the 1988 Koko waste dumping episode. He further posits that the Pre-1988 legislations ‘were disparate and inchoate’ (Ebohme, 2006:2) and there were general lack of awareness of environmental protection and development. Consequently, there was no specific organization or agency of government vested with the mandate to regulate activities of industrial concerns in the country as at then. Major Post-1988 environmental laws are The Natural Resources Conservation Council Decree 1989; Federal Environmental Protection Decree 1989; National Policy on the Environment Decree 1989; National Parks Decree 1991; Environmental Impact Assessment Decree 1992; Ministry of the Environment Decree, 1996 which replaced FEPA. The National Environmental Standards and Regulations Enforcement Agency (Establishment) Act 2007 is the most recent environmental enforcement Agency “charged with responsibility for the protection and development of the environment in Nigeria; and for related matters” (NESREA, 2007:3).

Ibaba (2010) lamented that none of the Post-1988 environmental laws was wholeheartedly implemented. He picked hole with the FEPA Act of 1988 for lacking strong provisions on the oil and gas industry except for S.23 of the Act which requires the Agency to ‘co-operate’ with the Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) to remove oil related pollutants discharge into the Nigerian environment as well as play supportive role to the Ministry of Petroleum Resources from time to time when the Ministry through its Directorate for Petroleum Resources (DPR) may require such from the Agency. The National Policy on the Environment, 1989 (Revised 1999) was developed from the FEPA Decree, 1988. This was the next environmental legislation that shows the willingness of the Nigerian government to tackle environmental problems. But, like the other pre-existing environmental provisions, it never so much left the paper on which it was written.  The State cleverly removed the oil industry from the supervision and control of these environmental policies.

Nigerian State and the Implementation of Environmental Policies

The Ministry of Petroleum Resources (MPR) has the statutory role of supervising and regulating the oil industry in Nigeria. The Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), a subsidiary of the NNPC which is under the supervision of the (MPR) has the statutory responsibility of developing environmental standards and policies specific to the oil industry in Nigeria (www.nnpc.com). Companies engaged in exploration and production activities in the oil and gas sector are regulated by the Environmental Guidelines and Standards for the Petroleum Industry in Nigeria (EGASPIN, 2002) produced by the Department of Petroleum Resources. However, as Ibaba (2010) noted, the Directorate has not been able to adequately discharge its regulatory function due to conflict of interest. As such, MNOCs have continued to assault the Niger Delta communities as they will not be held accountable by the Regulator (Bassey, 2008).

The only undisputed fact is that exploitation and production of hydrocarbon in the Niger Delta brought throes and woes to the inhabitants of that region. The people have become more miserable, impoverished, neglected, underdeveloped, marginalized, massively exploited and consigned to worst forms of inhuman treatment (Aghalino, 2000; Ibeanu, 2006; Allen, 2011; Ojakorotu & Gilbert, 2010). When the first smoke went up from the production facility at Oloibiri, Bayelsa State in 1958, there was great expectation and high hope; hope of a better life for the people of the region. Alas! The condition of the Niger Delta indigenes after over half a century is pain, frustration, injustice and exploitation. The environment is ravaged; degraded, destroyed and the living condition of the people is lamentable, precarious, terrible and dangerously dehumanizing (Ibeanu, 2008; Eregha & Irughe (2009); Justice In Nigeria Now (JINN), 2010; Anikpo, Ibaba,  Peterside, Onyido, Nyulaku, Ekiye & Kpodo (2013). The people felt cheated and shortchanged by the Nigerian State and the Multinational Oil Companies, which are enjoying government’s support in the despoliation of the Niger Delta environment as can be seen in the continued unhealthy hydrocarbon production practices namely gas flaring, infrastructural installation without environmental impact due diligence check which is a contravention of the provision of the 1992 Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA), (EIA Act, 1992).  Scholars, local and international agreed that hydrocarbon exploitation has left the Niger Delta region worse off. There is a theoretical argument known as Resource Curse Theory adopted in explicating this particular oddity (Ross, 2001; Utomi, 2003; Obi, 2008; Obi, 2010a).

DOWNLOAD (CHAPTER 1-5)