Project Description

CHAPTER ONE

 INTRODUCTION

 

1.1       BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

The Middle East is the most ancient region of human civilization. Around 10,000 BC, farming first developed in the area referred to as the Fertile Crescent (the area of land arching from the Persian Gulf over the watersheds of the Tigris and Euphrates river in Iraq through the eastern coast of the Mediterranean into Egypt) (Gelvin, 2007). The term “Middle East” emerged in Western diplomatic parlance in the early twentieth century referring to the area between the eastern Mediterranean and India. As a region of weak states penetrated by international powers, the origin of the Middle East dates back to the decline of Ottoman power in the eighteenth century (Gelvin, 2007). The Ottoman emirs who conquered the Middle East region in 1514 united the area under one ruler and kept control of it for over 400 years despite that the Great Powers that had already divided up most of Africa and Asia then made attempts to carve out influence in the Ottoman Empire (Hourani, 1991).

However, as the Ottoman Empire weakened, the major challenge revolved around how to manage the vast empire that was hitherto controlled by the Ottoman emirs. Britain, which had occupied Egypt in 1882 and had secured alliances in the Persian Gulf region, favored propping up the Ottoman Empire out of fear that its collapse would lead to a scramble for power by Russia and other European powers, thereby putting British interests at serious jeopardy. This precarious order collapsed with the First World War. Meanwhile, as the Young Turk government in Istanbul established an alliance with Germany, Britain reversed its century-old policy and moved to dismantle the Ottoman Empire and secure the Arab provinces for itself. During the war, the British made contradictory commitments: encouraging Hussein Bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, to lead an Arab revolt against Turkish rule and promising him rule over Greater Syria; at the same time promising much of Syria to the French and a homeland in Palestine to the burgeoning Zionist movement (Morris, 1994).

The modern Middle East was, therefore, born out of the contradictions of the post-World War I settlements. The British and the French divided up zones of influence in the Arab Middle East: the newly created states of Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine were placed under British mandate, and the newly created states of Syria and Greater Lebanon fell under French mandate. Egypt remained under British control. Turkey and Iran escaped direct foreign mandates, thus getting a head start in terms of nation- and state-building.

The Middle East of the post-Ottoman period between the end of World War I and the start of World War II had a number of characteristics. It separated Turkey from the Arab regions after centuries of intertwinement. It created an “Arab Middle East” with its own issues and conditions, separate from the issues of the emerging nation-states of Turkey and Iran. The common issues that emerged were the challenges of overcoming European mandate rule, the contradiction between championing Arabism but consolidating local territorial states, and the emerging question of Palestine (Lowi, 2009).

The 1940s were watershed years in more ways than one. The exhaustion of Western Europe in the Second World War meant that neither France, Britain, nor Germany would be able to maintain colonial influence in the Middle East and that the United States and soon the Soviet Union would emerge as the new superpowers in the global system. The end of European colonialism translated into independence for the territorial states of the Arab world, although the local political elites who inherited this independence maintained close relations with their European patrons (Lowi, 2009).

The discovery of oil in the 1930s and proof of its profound strategic importance in the Second World War had an immediate impact on the oil-rich states. Thus, as articulated by Ahmed (2004: 35):

the United States established a strategic alliance with Saudi Arabia; Britain reinforced a string of emirates it had helped establish along the western shores of the Persian Gulf first as trading posts and later as promising oil sources; and Western powers also grew intensely interested in the oil resources of Iran. This was translated into a large stake for British Petroleum in the Iranian oil industry, and later a U.S.-engineered coup in 1953 to unseat a nationalist prime minister—who was going about the nationalization of Iranian oil—to install a more cooperative Shah.

 

The dominance of Western influence in Turkey, Iran, and the Arab east in the wake of the war could have facilitated the establishment of a regional security system under Western tutelage. Indeed, the United States tried to do just that in the mid-1950s with the Baghdad Pact. The pact sought to bring together Turkey, Iran, and Iraq and some other Arab states in a pro-Western alliance to block the expansion of Soviet power into the region. But the conflict over the establishment of Israel set in motion a chain of events that led to the Arab states drifting away from Western control.

The United States tried first in 1955 to gather the Arab states under a pro-Western Baghdad Pact; the Soviets tried next with their support for a pan-Arabist Nasser. As long as the Cold War continued, each superpower had an interest to group Arab states in some form of bloc in its favor. When the Cold War ended and multipolarity no longer meant that the global adversary would gain an advantage, it became more tolerable and indeed desirable (Gelvin, 2007).

The pre-September 11 Middle East was also characterized by multiple power balances. During the height of the Cold War, the balance of power between the superpowers, through their local client states, was the main one that counted. As the Cold War wound down and ended, local power balances—in particular, the balance surrounding the Arab–Israeli conflict—became more significant. Arab–Israeli hostilities had instigated four wars in three decades, though by the mid-1980s an uneasy stability prevailed. The other balance of power that mattered during this period was that between Iran and Iraq. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the two states maintained a balance of power and mutual containment.

Direct U.S. military involvement in the Middle East began in the 1980s, with the U.S. Navy escorting oil tankers through the Persian Gulf. It escalated into full engagement in 1990–1991, with U.S. forces leading the war to push Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. But the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the occupation since then, has had far more dramatic consequences. It eliminated Iraq as a strong state, thus creating a regional power vacuum and completely altering the power balance and containment effects of that state. Second, it created a domestic power vacuum, which instead of flowering into democracy erupted into insecurity and sectarian civil war, consuming Iraqi lives and livelihoods and inexorably drawing in regional states as well. Third, it placed the U.S. military in the heart of the Middle East within the context of a long occupation and an aggressive regional regime-changing agenda (Owen, 2004; Mamdani, 2004).

The magnitude of the September 11, 2001, attacks triggered a fundamental change in U.S. foreign policy, bringing the neoconservative agenda to the fore and promoting preemptive intervention, unilateralism, and a focus on Islamic terrorism as the main security threat to the United States. This agenda led to the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq, threats to promote regime change in Iran and Syria, and pressure on nations to align along a “with-us-or-against-us” dichotomy. It also came with a strong democratization agenda arguing that terrorism was generated by repressive states and that more participatory political systems would help soak up the resentment and anger expressed in terrorist acts (Mcfau, 2003).

More fundamentally, the shift in U.S. government Middle East policy has also influenced Israeli policy. The new turn in U.S. government policy under the then U.S. President- George W. Bush after September 11 encouraged Israel to pursue more aggressive policies. During this period, Israel prosecuted two military campaigns: one in the summer of 2006 to eliminate Hizbollah in Lebanon and the other against Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

Against this background, the study examines the interface between the U.S government’s Middle East policy and the challenges of global security, between 1999 and 2013.  Basically, our central areas of focus include: the links between the pre-emptive strategy of the U.S government and the fight against international terrorism in the Middle East region; U.S. government’s strategic interest and her strategies of penetrating the Middle East region; as well as the strategic relationship between the US government and Israel and the instruments of international institutions on the resolution of the Middle East conflicts.

 

1.2       STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

International terrorism has long been recognized as a foreign and domestic security threat. To this end, a range of measures such as international cooperation, constructive engagement, economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures among others, have been generally employed to combat international terrorism (Perl, 2003). However, following the dismantling of the Soviet Union and the attendant de-ideologization of international political economy and triumph of international capitalism, the United States, being the major driver of international capitalism and Western-style democracy, has primarily tailored her foreign policy to achieve one basic aim; that is, to make the world free for liberal democracy. This, Okolie (2004:37) has aptly articulated:

Largely involves instituting a market economy where liberalization of trade and investment and unfettered movement of labour and international finance across the territorial units are guaranteed, safeguarded and promoted. This will not only reinforce the expansion of international capitalism but will ensure free movement of capital goods, and commodities across the globe in a manner that will lubricate advanced capitalist economies and sustain the asymmetrical international economic order and existing highly elastic lopsided development.

 

Based on the foregoing, the US policies, citizens, and interests have remained the prime targets for international terrorism (Perl, 2003). This reached the apogee with the September 11^th 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, the Washington, D.C., area, and Pennsylvania. Prior to September 2001 terrorist attack, the US government anti-terrorism policy, particularly from the late 1970s up to the mid-1990s generally focused on deterring and punishing state sponsors as opposed to terrorist groups themselves. The passage of the landmark Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 signaled an important shift in anti-terrorism policy.

The bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and the September 11th terrorist attack of 2001 coalesced to bring the issue of terrorism to the fore of American public interest. As a result, the hitherto US public perception of terrorism as primarily an overseas issue changed dramatically. Thus, instead of international cooperation, constructive engagement or economic sanctions, the US policy on terrorism focused on pre-emptive dismantling and rooting out self-supporting terrorist entities. The military assault against Al Qaeda and its affiliates by the US government under President George Bush Jnr epitomized this important shift in the US policy.

The US policy of pre-emption dates back to an internal set of military guidelines, called a “Defense Planning Guidance,” (routinely prepared every few years by the Defense Department) drafted in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz, the then Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (the Pentagon’s third-highest ranking civilian).Wolfowitz’s draft argued for a new military and political strategy in a post-Cold War world. Containment, it said, “is a relic of the Cold War. America should talk loudly, carry a big stick, and use its military power to pre-empt the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and if America has to act alone, so be it” (Zunes, 2004:15). Controversy erupted after the draft was leaked to the press. The White House ordered the then Defense Secretary – Dick Cheney to rewrite it. In the new draft, mention was not made of pre-emption or U.S. willingness to act alone (Zunes, 2004).

Thereafter, the US government released her National Security Strategy (NSS) which formally articulated, for the first time, the various elements of the Bush Doctrine in one place. The 33-page document presented a bold and comprehensive reformulation of U.S. foreign policy. It outlined a new and muscular American posture in the world; a posture that would rely on preemption to deal with rogue states and terrorists harboring weapons of mass destruction. The reformulated U.S government foreign policy which essentially relied on preemption found expression in the U.S government Middle East policy. This is because some of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East then were not only seen basically as sponsors of international terrorism but equally amassing weapons of mass destruction.

In the aftermath of 9/11, however, the U.S government strategy changed drastically from low-intensity proxy war to high-intensity direct military confrontation/invasion (Mamdani, 2004). For the Bush administration, the terrorist attacks of September 11 provided a golden opportunity to do away with the relics and inhibitions of the Cold War and to declare open military attack on militant nationalism. The ambition to dislodge militant nationalist regime was summarily couched as a “regime change” and “democratization.” Hence, in less than two years, the United States moved from the invasion of Taliban-ruled Afghanistan for allegedly harboring Osama Bin Laden and his terrorist organization to that of Saddam Hussein-ruled Iraq for alleged accumulation of WMDs and maintenance of links with terrorist organizations.

The link between the U.S government’s Middle East policy and the challenges of global security has remained a subject of intellectual discourse and considerable efforts have been expended by scholars to examine the rationale for the US and her strategies of intervention in the Middle East. Ahmed (2003), Mamdani (2004), Ifesinachi (2006), and Gardner (2008) see the US-led war on terror in terms of unilateralism. For them the solution to terrorism is not just to punish terrorists but in seeking out a long-term political solution to the political malaise prompting terrorism. Okolie (2005) advocates for a new global security codes that would ensure that enforcement is done under the auspices of the United Nations rather than the U.S. government hegemony and unilateralism that manifested in the policy of preemption. Galston (2003), Wirtz & Russel (2003), Intriligator (2007), and Richter (2009), see U.S. government’s preemptive attacks in the Middle East as a violation of international law and the UN system that was set up in large part to prevent precisely such preemption.               On the other hand, Falode (2002); Abdul, (2002); Bender (2004); Finstad (2005); and Kinninmont (2010) see the factors of economy, territory, irredentism and religion to essentially account for volatile relationships in the Middle East, and this explains why U.S. government would no longer seek the views of her allies before embarking on any political -adventure in the international environment.

Moreso, Zunes (2006); Brezezihski (2009); Akpula (2011); Asmus (2012); and Agu (2012)   maintain that the U.S government is never an objective mediator in the Israeli-Arab conflicts and that the U.S government policy has created enormous resentment as diplomatic, financial and military support for the Israeli regime and its humiliating attitude to the Palestinians has continued.

Despite the existing inquiries, the extant literature has suffered from important shortcomings. Indeed, the existing inquiry in this area has not satisfactorily explained the impact of the pre-emptive strategy adopted by the U.S government on the fight against international terrorism in the Middle East region. More importantly, the existing inquiries failed in evaluating adequately the link between the quest to safeguard the U.S. government’s strategic interest and the US government strategies of penetrating the Middle East region. Finally, adequate attempts have not been made to explore the interface between the strategic relationship between the US–Israeli governments and the instruments of international institutions on the resolution of the Middle East conflicts.

In the light of the above, attempt is made, therefore, to critically examine the U.S. government’s Middle East policy and challenges of global security in line with the outlined research questions stated below:

1. Did the adoption of pre-emptive strategy by the U.S government reduce the incidence of international terrorism in the Middle East region?

 

2. Was U.S government strategy of penetrating the Middle East region influenced by the quest to safeguard her strategic interest in the region?

 

3. Could the failure of international institutions in resolving the Middle East conflicts be linked to the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel?

 

1.3       OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

The study has broad and specific objectives. Broadly, the study evaluates the link between the US government’s Middle East policy and the challenges of global security between 1999 and 2012.  The specific objectives are to:

1. Determine whether the adoption of pre-emptive strategy by the U.S government reduced the incidence of international terrorism in the Middle East region.

 

2. Ascertain whether there was any link between U.S government strategy of penetrating the Middle East region and the quest to safeguard her strategic interest in the region.

 

3. Establish whether the failure of international institutions in resolving the Middle East conflicts was linked to the strategic partnership between the United States and Israel.

 

  1.4    SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

The study has both theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, the study shall synchronize with the existing inquiries in this area to form a dependable pool of literature to the benefit of researchers, students and policy makers. Scientific knowledge is cumulative. Thus, this study, by clarifying issues and facilitating understanding, shall chart a new intellectual course in the study of Middle East crises, broaden the existing knowledge and above all form a reference material for further research and inquiries. To this end, the study is a welcome contribution to the on-going intellectual debate on the justification or otherwise of the US government’s pre-emptive military invasions in the Middle East region especially as it concerns international law and global security.

Practically, this study will contribute to the knowledge and awareness on the consequences of United States preemptive strategy in the Middle East region, coupled with alternative means through which myriad of challenges inclined to the region shall be resolved.  The study will assist the United Nations cum other policy makers place emphasis on global security with clearer identification of what constitute terrorism and / or freedom-fighting.  It will equally lay bare the economic exigencies that undergird the U.S government’s actions and inactions in the region, there by, encouraging American scientists to expedite action in discovering other substances with high economic value like the oil.

More importantly, the study will illuminate the understanding of the thrust of the US government defense and strategic policy with a view to highlighting that the US government unilateral penetration and domination of the Middle East region is a way to redraw the strategic map of the region for her dominance.

The US government Middle East policy suggests a new emphasis on unilateralism and hegemonies. In the aftermath of the 9/11, the US government had contended that it would no longer rely solely on reactive posture of the Cold War to deal with the “rogue states” and the terrorist organizations. Preemption has thus become a policy preference for dealing with threats of this kind. The findings of this study will furnish global actors with valuable information/data as they articulate potent policies, mechanisms and strategies to effectively grapple with the lingering crisis in the Middle East region.

DOWNLOAD (CHAPTER 1-5)